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1. INTRODUCTION 
The debt market in emerging market countries consists of sovereign debt and corporate debt, 
of which sovereign debt segment has become, in recent years, an integral part of the global 
fixed income investment landscape given their size and rapid growth. Therefore, understand-
ing emerging market debt and its return-risk profile is of great interest. 
One of the stylized facts of sovereign debt markets in emerging countries is the Mex-
ican financial crisis in 1994-95 because its occurrence revealed the need for better informa-
tion available to the public and financial market players. More generally, the emerging mar-
ket crises during the 1990s have generated considerable debate among officials, researchers, 
institutional investors and the international community about the role of transparency as an 
explanation of the triggering of crises and further on its role in international financial stabili-
ty. The adoption of internationally recognized standards and codes of best practices came to 
be seen as a way to strengthen international financial system. This was thought to be neces-
sary for markets to make prudent lending and investment decisions. While many agree that 
greater availability of information would not by itself be sufficient to prevent financial crises, 
it was nevertheless generally accepted that disclosure and transparency are necessary to im-
prove the International Financial Architecture. 
Then, actions in the international community has initially got started on setting stan-
dards for improving, on the one hand, the timeliness and quality of information contained in 
key macroeconomic variables and on the other hand, the transparency of public sector activi-
ties including fiscal, monetary and financial policies. In particular, we recognize the IMF’s 
efforts devoted to the establishment of the data and macroeconomic policy transparency stan-
dards whose aims are to improve timely release of economic and financial data to the public 
as well as information on their compilation procedures. Most importantly, the IMF member 
countries have been engaged to adopt, on voluntary basis, those international standards and 3  
 
codes of good practices to help their economies and financial systems function properly at the 
national and international levels, and to share with the public timely and accurate data. 
So far, several studies have examined the impact of standards and codes on emerging 
market economies’ borrowing costs and access to international capital markets by measuring 
their effect on sovereign bond spreads, which are generally considered to be a measure of the 
market’s perception of the probability of future crises. The empirical evidence according to 
which the borrowing costs are reduced for emerging market adhering to internationally rec-
ognized standards has been presented (see, e.g., Gelos and Wei, 2002; Christofides, Mulder 
and Tiffin, 2003; Glennerster and Shin, 2003; Cady, 2005). Albeit their great contribution in 
understanding the effect of macroeconomic and data transparency, these studies mainly con-
centrated, however, on the impact of the international standards and codes on the spreads of 
the primary debt market. Then, there is still a need for empirical findings in the secondary 
markets.  
This present paper attempts to fill this gap by evaluating the impact of the data and 
macroeconomic transparency standards on sovereign bond spreads of emerging markets as a 
measure of the borrowing costs. We focus on the following standards and codes: the Special 
Data Dissemination Standards, the Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and 
Financial Policies, and the Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Policy Transparency. Using data 
on Emerging Market Bond Index spread, we show that the SDDS subscription leads to sig-
nificantly reduce the borrowing costs of emerging markets’ issuers. The adherence to mone-
tary and financial policy transparency codes generates a significant impact on the sovereign 
spreads, but the sign of the effect remains difficult to interpret. The fiscal policy transparency 
codes have an insignificant effect on the spreads. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the economic 
background of the studied problem and a brief review of literature. Section 3 discusses the 4  
 
empirical approach. Section 4 describes the data used in the paper. Section 5 reports and in-
terprets the obtained results. Summary remarks and policy implications are provided in Sec-
tion 6. 
 
2.  ECONOMIC MOTIVATIONS AND LITERATURE REVIEW  
In the aftermath of the Mexican financial crisis (1994) and especially the East Asian crisis, 
the international community has been engaged in reforming the so-called International Finan-
cial Architecture. Of the possible explanations for the advent of these crises, the lack of 
transparency has received great attention and has been widely discussed. International finan-
cial institutions and governments of creditor countries claimed that lack of relevant informa-
tion may produce triggered or exacerbated crises leading to contagion and herding behaviour. 
To be aware of the essential role of data transparency in reducing the likelihood of financial 
crises (thus strengthening the international financial stability), the international community 
called for the release of timely dissemination of macroeconomic and financial data to market 
participants. 
Given its role in promoting greater financial stability in global context, the IMF en-
gaged in the establishment of different standards and codes concerning the timing and avail-
ability of macroeconomic data. Its work on data dissemination standards began in October 
1995 just after the occurrence of the Mexican crisis. The aim of these standards is to provide 
a conceptual framework for countries that might seek access to international capital markets 
to render public their economic and financial data through the availability of timely and com-
prehensive statistics. This clearly contributes to incite the pursuit of sound macroeconomic 
policies and to get better functioning of financial markets. These standards are named Special 
Data Dissemination Standards (SDDS) which were approved by the IMF Executive Board in 
March 1996. On September 26, 1999, the Interim Committee (currently called the Interna-5  
 
tional Monetary and Financial Committee) adopted the Code of Good Practices on Transpar-
ency in Monetary and Financial Policies, designated to guide member countries to increase 
transparency in the conduct of these policies. Two year later, the Executive Board of Direc-
tors of the IMF approved the Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency on March 23, 
2001. The objective of this code is to provide member countries to increase their transparency 
through better informing the public about the design and results of fiscal policy, making gov-
ernments more accountable for the implementation of fiscal policy, and thereby strengthening 
credibility and public understanding of macroeconomic policies. 
It is also important to mention that the establishment of the Financial Stability Forum 
in February 1999 by the G7 finance ministers and central bank governors was a response to 
the willingness of the international community to promote the adoption and implementation 
of these standards both inside countries and globally. To date, each country has at its disposal 
the list of the various economic and financial standards that are considered as important for 
sound, stable and well functioning financial systems as indicated in the appendix. 
The apparition of internationally recognized standards and codes raises some intrigu-
ing questions. Among other things, one may wonder to know the relationship between stan-
dards and codes on the one hand, and their economic outcomes on the other hand. Several 
studies have empirically examined the effect of international standards and codes on emerg-
ing market economies’ sovereign bond spreads. For instance, Chortareas et al. (2001) found 
that countries which release more macroeconomic data have lower inflation rate. Gelos and 
Wei (2002) proved, in addition to the conclusion of Chortareas et al. (2001), that these coun-
tries attract more foreign direct investment inflows. In a recent study, Christofides, Mulder 
and Tiffin (2003) showed that the subscription to international standards contributed signifi-
cantly to explain changes in sovereign credit spreads and ratings. The Institute of Interna-
tional Finance (2002) and Glennerster and Shin (2003) provided evidence that the sovereign 6  
 
risk premium in emerging markets is significantly reduced after the subscription to interna-
tional standards. Cady (2005) used data on launch credit spreads and reached similar conclu-
sion as in Glennerster and Shin (2003). Finally, in a related study, Andritzky and al. (2007) 
found that macroeconomic and data announcement effects in emerging market bonds reduce 
uncertainty and contribute to stabilize spreads. This result particularly leads to think about an 
eventual diminution of spread levels       
Our paper is part of the above literature, but it is different in two crucial points. First, 
we focus on the secondary markets and not on the primary markets as in the majority of pre-
vious studies. The rationale behind this proving ground lays on the fact that secondary mar-
kets better reflect the changes in investors’ sentiment about the engagement of one country to 
improve the accuracy and frequency of macroeconomic information released to the public. 
Second, we only relate the evolution of emerging market bond spreads to three most impor-
tant international standards and codes: the SDDS, the monetary and financial policy transpar-
ency, and the fiscal policy transparency. Meanwhile, by adopting this choice, our study is not 
general like that of Christofides, Mulder and Tiffin (2003) in the sense that these authors in-
vestigated a greater number of standards and codes.  
  
3.  MODEL AND ESTIMATION ISSUES 
We assess the impact of macroeconomic and data transparency represented by the Monetary 
and Financial Transparency, the Fiscal Transparency and the SDDS on the difference in 
emerging market countries’ mean sovereign credit spreads using a pooled time-series cross-
sectional model with fixed effects of the following form (see, Edwards, 1984)
1: 
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In this specification, log(SPi) refers to a continuous dependent variable which is 
measured by the logarithm of the EMBIG spread for the emerging country i. Xjit refers to the 7  
 
explanatory variable j for the country i at time t. The intercept coefficient αi reflects the coun-
try i's characteristics that are assumed to be unchanged over the estimation period. βj refers to 
slope parameters of a specific explanatory variable j that captures the common effect of that 
variable on the sovereign credit spread movements. εt is a random error term. N is the total 
number of cross-sections included in the empirical model. T stands for the total number of 
observations of the panel data set. 
Here, the set of explanatory variables includes a dummy variable which represents the 
subscription date of each country to newly introduced international codes and standards, and 
ten macroeconomic fundamentals. Since our study focuses on the FPT, the MFPT and the 
SDDS, three alternative models will be estimated. To be more precise, dummy variables are 
of our preliminary interest because they controls for the changes in the sovereign spreads 
before and after an emerging country decided to become more transparent via a publication of 
the related standards. They take the value of one from the subscription date to the end of the 
study period and zero otherwise. If the enhanced macroeconomic and data transparency leads 
to reduce the country default risk, all dummy variables are expected to exercise a negative 
and significant influence on the EMBIG spread fluctuations. Macroeconomic fundamentals 
are introduced in the empirical model for two main reasons. First, their presence offers an 
easy framework to isolate the specific effects of the transparency factor because sovereign 
spreads’ movements also depend on the changing macroeconomic conditions. Second, by 
doing so, we are able, just similar to previous studies, to identify the determinants of the so-
vereign spreads whose level is informative of the quality of emerging market debt issuers. 
Effectively, we construct the following macroeconomic variables
2: the inflation rate or the 
growth rate of changes in the consumer price index (CPI), the budget deficit as a share of 
GDP (BUD/GDP), the ratio of total external debt to GDP (DEBT/GDP), the ratio of total 
imports plus exports to GDP (TRA/GDP), the ratio of total current account to GDP 8  
 
(CUR/GDP), the ratio of total interest amount to GDP (INT/GDP), the liquidity ratio meas-
ured as the total of reserves in proportion of the total external debt service (RES/DEBT), the 
growth rate of GDP denominated in local currency (GROWTH), the logarithm of the US fed-
eral funds interest rate (USFED) and the logarithm of the yield on the 10-year US Treasury 
bond (USLONG). By default, these variables mirror the general monetary and liquidity con-
ditions in sample emerging markets.            
The estimation of the time-series cross-sectional model is often carried out by using 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) procedure. As widely discussed in econometric literature, this 
model permits to solve many problems of traditional methods of the comparative research 
which employs either time series analysis or cross-sectional analysis. For instance, the limited 
number of spatial units in cross-sectional analysis and the limited number of available data 
over time (i.e., small ‘N’ and ‘T’) often lead these two individual techniques to violate basic 
assumptions of standard OLS analysis. Most obviously, estimated results are largely biased if 
the model contains many explanatory variables comparatively to very few observations. In 
this schema of things, the pooled time-series cross-sectional design allows the removal of this 
restriction because the number of observations is now the product between N and T. This fea-
ture is also useful in that one can easily set a framework allowing for a multivariate analysis 
(i.e., large number of independent variables). Next, pooled time-series cross-sectional models 
offer the possibility to investigate not only the variation of what emerges through time or 
space, but also the variation of these two dimensions simultaneously. The reason is that, in-
stead of testing a cross-section model for all countries at one point in time or testing a time-
series model for one country using its time-series data, a pooled model is tested for all coun-
tries through time. Accordingly, the pooled time-series model with fixed effects we devel-
oped above is highly suitable to our problem of assessing the effects of sample countries’ 9  
 
increased transparency because it captures both cross-sectional effect of explanatory variables 
on credit spreads as well as the time-series effect within markets. 
It is, however, important to note that the pooled model encounters some methodologi-
cal problems albeit advantageous for dealing with both time and space, of which the most 
important include the serial correlation between a country i’s errors, the contemporaneous 
cross-sectional correlation of the errors, the cross-sectional heteroscedasticity of the errors 
and the possibly causal heterogeneity of parameters across cross-section units
3 (see, e.g., 
Hicks, 1994; Beck and Katz, 1996). So, in this paper we employ the seemingly unrelated re-
gression (SUR) method, also referred to as the Parks estimators, to correct for these estima-
tion problems. In fact, the seemingly unrelated regression procedure treats each cross-section 
(or market) and the time series within that cross-section as a separate equation that is unre-
lated to any other cross-section and its time series in the pooled data set. Most specifically, 
this estimation procedure is interpretable as a series of a country specific regression analysis 
that utilizes contemporaneous cross-equation error correlations among the error of a system 
of equation to improve the efficiency of the estimates of an equation system (Hicks, 1994). 
 
4. DATA 
In this paper, the question of whether the improving macroeconomic and data transparency 
leads to lower yield spreads (or country risk reduction) in sovereign bond markets is investi-
gated. Sample emerging markets include Argentina, Brazil, Croatia, Ecuador, Mexico, Tur-
key and South Africa. Quarterly data on yield spreads of the JP Morgan Emerging Market 
Index Global (EMBIG) are used over the period from January 1994 to December 2002
4. The 
choice of EMBIG to the detriment of EMBI is explained by the wider range of debt instru-
ments that the EMBIG covers. Recall that yield spread, often measured by the number of 
basis points, is the difference between the yield on emerging market bond index and the yield 10  
 
on a bond of similar characteristics, but considered as free of default risk (typically a US 
Treasury security). One basis point is equal to a hundredth of a percentage point. More de-
tailed description of emerging market debt indices is provided in Cunningham (1999).  
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
Table 1 gives the summarized characteristics of our sample data. At the first sight, we 
observe that the sovereign spread is around 801 basis points on average with a highest value 
of 6475 which is equivalent to 67.75%. Besides, it should be noted that the average deficit or 
surplus budget and the current deficit over GDP stand both at -1%; the inflation rate is some-
what high for sample markets because it comes to 74%; the total external debt is near to 50% 
of the GDP; and finally the total reserves represent only 22% of the total external debt. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
Table 2 offers a close look on the dates of subscription of sample markets to different 
transparency policies. Our selected markets have mainly subscribed to the SDDS in 1996, 
except for Brazil and Ecuador. As regards to the FPT and MFPT, the newest subscription 
dates started in 1999, which clearly restrict the possibility to include a large number of coun-
tries in our sample. This also limits our interpretations of the empirical results in the later 
section. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
Figure 1 depicts the evolution of the emerging market sovereign spreads over the first 
quarter of 1994 to the fourth quarter of 2002. As we can observe, sovereign debt markets in 
Argentina and Ecuador pay the highest spread level which particularly indicates the impor-
tance of default risk in these markets. If we look at the dates of subscription to the SDDS of 
sample markets, we are able to notify that credit spreads globally went down in the aftermath 
of the 1994 debt crisis in the Latin American region. The time-paths also testified an upward 11  
 
trend of credit spreads since the beginning of 1998, and that continued until the end of our 
study period.  
To close this section, it is important to mention that data for the EMBIG spreads are 
drawn from JP Morgan and macroeconomic fundamentals and external debt variables are 
obtained from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. To preserve the country-specific 
factors, we construct all our variables based on local currency basis.  
  
5. EMPIRICAL  RESULTS 
This section presents the empirical results from the estimation of our pooled model described 
in Section 3. Particularly, the results are divided into three groups depending on the types of 
subscription events (the SDDS, the FPT, or the MFPT). First, we study the impact of the 
SDDS subscription on the time-varying level of the EMBIG spreads by adding the dummy 
variable SDDS into our pooled time-series cross-sectional model. Next, the dummy variable 
SDDS is step by step replaced by the FPT and MFPT variables respectively. It is important to 
notify that the first model contains every market in the sample data whereas only markets 
which subscribed to the FPT and MFPT are included the second and the third models.         
Table 3 reports the whole results from estimating our pooled model. Generally, there 
is a relatively high level of fit for three examined models since the adjusted R-squared ranges 
from 66.7% to 77.5%. The significance of the majority of coefficients at conventional levels 
also indicates the correct selection of explanatory variables. 
With regard to model 1, our variable of interest is the dummy variable SDDS. The 
coefficient attached to this variable is, as expected, negative and significant at 5%. Accor-
dingly, for countries which subscribed to the Special Data Dissemination Standard, the cross-
country sovereign spreads decreases by 23.4%. This is informative of the reduction of pre-
mium attributed to investors for holding the debt securities issued by emerging market bor-12  
 
rowers. In this schema of things, policy makers will have an interest in improving data trans-
parency to lower borrowing costs. It should be noted that the obtained result is in line with 
previous findings revealed by, among others, Christofides, Mulder and Tiffin (2003), and 
Cady (2005). 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
Contrary to what we might expect, changes in the EMBIG spreads are not at all af-
fected by the country’s subscription to the fiscal policy transparency from the view of the 
coefficient associated with the FPT variable. That is, a better transparency in terms of fiscal 
policies does not necessarily conduct to lower spreads. For instance, this result is found at 
least for the countries which are included in the cross-sectional regression. Since the impact 
of the fiscal transparency on the sovereign spreads is, to our knowledge, never treated in pre-
vious literature, there is no possibility to compare our results.   
Concerning the effect on the EMBIG spreads of the monetary and financial policy 
transparency; the result shows a positive and significant relationship between two variables of 
interest. Effectively, we observe an increase of 30.5% in the spread levels after the subscrip-
tion date of one country to the MFPT standard. Clearly, this impact is difficult to be inter-
preted. To give an explanation, one may think that the effect of other variables prevails that 
of the MFPT subscription during the recent years, and leads the sovereign spreads in most 
countries go up to their highest levels observed during the estimation period.  
Like previous works which attempt to analyze the impact of macroeconomic funda-
mentals on the emerging market spreads, the present study also finds the dominant effect of 
the liquidity factor (cf. the ratio of total reserves to the total external debt) and the yield on 
10-year US Treasury bond. In fact, the coefficient attached to the RES/DEBT variable is neg-
ative and highly significant, indicating that the more important is the liquidity, the more the 
spread will decrease. The same pattern is acknowledged in the case of the USLONG variable. 13  
 
This is explainable because an increase in the yield on the US long-term bond normally leads 
to lower the yield on bonds of similar characteristics. The other important determinants of the 
EMBIG spreads include the total external debt to GDP ratio and the total imports plus exports 
to GDP ratio. 
                 
6. CONCLUSION 
The emerging market crises of the 1990s have generated considerable debate about the New 
International Financial Architecture (NIFA) and were partially attributed to a lack of market 
information. Improving transparency is considered as the main reform of this NIFA. 
This paper investigated whether macroeconomic and data transparency standards lead 
to lower yield spreads in sovereign bond markets. The endogenous variable, sovereign credit 
spread, is taken from JP Morgan’s Emerging Market Bond Index Global. The factor of inter-
est, the subscription to the Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) is represented by a 
dummy variable that is set to be equal to one for the quarters following the subscription. We 
also consider the subscription to ‘The Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary 
and Financial Policies’ and ‘The Code of Good Practices in Fiscal Transparency’. The influ-
ence of other factors, mainly macroeconomic fundamentals and external debt variables which 
have been broadly considered in the literature (Kamin and Kleist, 1999; and Ferrucci, 2003) 
is controlled for. 
Using quarterly data and a pooled time-series regression analysis, we found that the 
macroeconomic and data transparency leads to significantly lower spread levels only when 
the considered country subscribed to the SDDS. There is a significant response of the spread 
levels following the subscription to the monetary and financial policy transparency standards; 
however the impact is positive and therefore difficult to be interpreted. The adoption of the 
fiscal policy transparency has no significant impact on the spreads. In addition, macroeco-14  
 
nomic fundamentals seem to play an important role in the determination of the borrowing 
cost in debt markets of emerging countries. Of which, the most important factors are the li-
quidity and the yield on the US long-term bond. In this schema of things, policy makers will 
have an interest in improving data transparency and liquidity factor to lower borrowing costs. 





















 15  
 
NOTES 
1The log-linear relationship of the sovereign spread determinants is derived from assuming 
the risk neutral lenders and the competitive financial market. In the more complex context, 
Feder and Just (1977), Eaton and Gersovitz (1980), and Sachs (1981) obtained the similar 
relationship.    
 
2Most of these variables have been used in the previous literature and have been found to 
have a significant impact on sovereign credit spreads (see, for example, Eichengreen and 
Mody, 2000; Min and al., 2003; Jüttner and al., 2006). 
 
3In some cases, the slope coefficients of the pooled model are heterogeneous across cross-
section units because the errors tend to be nonrandom. Then, the assumed homogeneity of 
slope coefficients might be not reasonable. 
 
4To measure the historical performance of emerging market debt, JP Morgan publishes two 
main variants of sovereign bond indices. The first measure, called Emerging Market Bond 
Index, tracks returns and spreads on Brady bonds and some other restructured sovereign in-
struments in emerging market countries. The second measure is the Emerging Market Bond 
Index Global (EMBIG), which is designated to track the total returns for dollar-denominated 
Brady bonds, Eurobonds, traded loans and local market debt instruments issued by sovereign 
and quasi-sovereign entities of emerging markets countries. Currently, the EMBI Global cov-
ers 188 instruments across 33 emerging countries. For being selected in these indices, sove-
reign debt instruments must have a face value of over US$500 million and at least 2.5 years 
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Table 1 - Basic statistics of the cross-sectional data 
 
     Mean   Std. Dev.  Maximum  Minimum  Jarque-Bera   Probability
SP (Spread)    801.00  938.95 6475.00 80.00 3109.21  0.00
BUD/GDP     -0.01  0.01 0.01 -0.05 138.84  0.00
CPI   0.74  4.05 44.53 -0.02 64053.32 0.00
CUR/GDP  -0.01  0.01 0.06 -0.07 277.28  0.00
DEBT/GDP   0.47  0.24 1.38 0.14 86.88  0.00
GROWTH   0.06  0.08 0.37 -0.11 139.00  0.00
INT/GDP  0.03  0.01 0.07 0.01 21.61  0.00
RES/DEBT   0.22  0.11 0.68 0.05 177.99  0.00
TRA/GDP  -0.01  0.02 0.04 -0.09 102.14  0.00
USFED   0.05  0.01 0.07 0.01 62.32  0.00
USLONG  0.06  0.01 0.08 0.04 1.45  0.48
Notes: this table provides basic statistics of the cross-section data used in our study. The dependent variable is 
none other than the logarithm of the Emerging Market Bond Index Global spreads. BUD/GDP, CPI, CUR/GDP, 
DEBT/GDP, DEBT/GDP, GROWTH, INT/GDP, RES/DEBT, TRA/GDP, USFED and USLONG refer respec-
tively to the ratio of budget deficit to GDP, the inflation rate, the ratio of total current account to GDP, the ratio 
of total external debt to GDP, the growth rate of GDP denominated in local currency, the ratio of total interest 
amount to GDP, the liquidity ratio measured as the total of reserves in proportion of the total external debt ser-
vice, the ratio of total imports plus exports to GDP (TRA/GDP), the logarithm of the US federal funds interest 
rate and the logarithm of the yield on the 10-year US Treasury bond. These macroeconomic fundamentals are 
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Table 2 - Subscription dates of sample markets to the Special Data Dissemination Stan-
dards (SDDS), Fiscal Policy Transparency (FPT) and Monetary and Financial Policy 
Transparency (MFPT) 
 
Country  Date of SDDS 
subscription
Date of FPT 
subscription
Date of MFPT 
subscription
Argentina  August 16, 1996 April 15, 1999 April 15, 1999
Brazil  March 14, 2001 December 6, 2001 Nonsubscriber
Croatia  May 20, 1996 November 24, 2004 August 12, 2002
Ecuador  March 27, 1998 Nonsubscriber Nonsubscriber
Mexico  August 13, 1996 September 16, 2002 October 11, 2001
South Africa  August 2, 1996 Nonsubscriber Nonsubscriber
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Table 3 - Estimation results from the pooled time-series model with fixed effects 
 
Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 














































































Subscription date to the FPT (FPT)  0.191 
(1.418) 
 
Subscription date to the MFPT (MFPT)    0.305
* 
(1.691) 
Fixed Effects      
South Africa-C  3.798     
Argentina--C 5.431  5.942  7.012 
Brazil-C 5.550  6.436   
Croatia-C 6.033    8.407 
Ecuador-C 5.472     
Mexico-C 5.340  5.893  6.915 
Turkey-C 5.294  4.901   
R-squared 0.791  0.702  0.724 
Adjusted R-squared  0.775  0.667  0.686 
Notes: this table reports the estimated coefficients from estimating the general pooled model. In model 1, we 
relate the evolution of the EMBIG spreads to a set of one dummy variable (SDDS) and ten explanatory variables 
which consist of macroeconomic fundamentals. The models 2 and 3 are quite similar to the model 1 with a small 
difference. That is, instead of the dummy variable SDDS, we use respectively the dummy variables FPT and 
MFPT. The number of cross-sections (or countries) is equal to 7, 4 and 3 for models 1, 2 and 3 respectively. 
* 
and 
** indicate that the associated coefficient is statistically significant at 10% and 5% respectively. The t-
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APPENDIX 
Key Standards endorsed by the IMF and World Bank 
Subject areas  Key standards  Issuing institutions 
Macroeconomic policy and data transparency 
Monetary and financial policy 
transparency 
Code of Good Practices on 
Transparency in Monetary and 
Financial policies  
IMF 
Fiscal policy transparency  Code of Good Practices in Fis-
cal Transparency  IMF 
Data dissemination 
Special Data Dissemination 
Standard (SDDS)/General Data 
Dissemination System (GDDS) 
IMF 
Institutional and market infrastructure 
Insolvency 
Principles and Guidelines on 
Effective Insolvency and Credi-
tor Rights System 
World Bank 
Corporate Governance  Principles of Corporate Gov-
ernance  OECD 
Accounting  International Accounting Stan-
dards (IAS) 
International Accounting Stan-
dards Board (IASB) 
Auditing  International Standards on Au-
diting (ISA) 
International Federation of Ac-
countants (IFAC) 
Payment and Settlement 
Core Principles for Systemati-




ties Settlements Systems 
Committee on Payment and 
Settlement Systems (CPSS) 
 
CPPS and International Organi-
zation of Securities Commis-
sions (IOSCO) 
Money Laundering 
The Forty Recommendations/ 8 
special Recommendations 
Against Terrorist Financing 
Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF) 
Financial Regulation and supervision 
Banking Supervision  Core Principles for Effective 
Banking Supervision 
Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) 
Securities Regulation  Objectives and Principles of 
Securities Regulation 
International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (IO-
SCO) 
Insurance Supervision  Insurance Core Principles  International Association of 
Insurance (IAIS) 
Source: Financial Stability Forum. 
 